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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that funds which are actually needed for expansion or reserve pur-
poses will be distributed. The loss to the corporation of the use of
these funds must surely act to throttle business expansion and effect
productive employment. 0 8
Fortunately, however, the statute has been administered in an
unusually tolerant manner.10 9 Much of the fear created within the
ranks of corporate managers by a strict reading of the statute has
been dissipated by the temperate attitude of the courts and the Com-
missioner. The courts have adopted a generous interpretation of the
"reasonable needs" of a business 110 and have been reluctant to sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the directors."' In addition, the
decisions have carefully circumscribed the discretion of the tax au-
thorities in their enforcement of the statute.112  In a similarly
moderate manner, the Commissioner has sought to apply the penalty
only when "... a common-sense view of the whole picture makes it
reasonably clear that there was a tax avoiding purpose, and that the
reasons alleged for the accumulation are not reliable or sufficient" 113
The small number of deficiency letters issued annually under the
section," 4 and the failure to bring before a court even one corpora-
tion whose stock and control were both widely dispersed,115 point up
the limited enforcement measures undertaken by the Commissioner.
In short, a wise administrative policy has prevented Section 102 from
becoming either a present threat to business or an insurmountable
obstacle in the path of a growing enterprise.
VINDICATION OF FAmILY PARTNERSHIPS
The definition of "partner," as amplified by a recent amendment
to Section 3797 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, now includes
a person who ". . . owns a capital interest in a partnership in which
108 See note 93 supra.
109 See Cary, supra note 93, at 220.
110 See Cary, supra note 15, at 1306. For examples of generous interpreta-
tions of business needs, see J. L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 T. C. 530 (1948);
Lion Clothing Co., 8 T. C. 1181 (1947). A more restricted interpretation may
be found in World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir.
1948).
11" R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 668 (W. D. Ky.
1933), aff'd, United States v. R. C. Tway Coal Sales, 75 F. 2d 336 (6th Cir.
1935); Lane Drug Co., 3 CCH 1944 TC MEm. DEc. 394 (1944).
112 See Cary, supra note 15, at 1307.
113 Miller, Improper Accumulation of Surplus-(2) The Lawyer's Task of
Giving Advice as to Current Dividend Policy, in View of Section 102 I.R.C.,
1 AmE UNIV. TAx INST. LECrTmUs 103, 110 (1948).
114 During the period from 1939 to 1947 less than 100 deficiency letters were
issued annually under the section. Id. at 111.
115 Covers the period from 1913 to 1950. See Buck and Shackelford, supra
note 89, at 337.
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capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not such
interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person." 1
A new section of the Code, Section 191, permits a donee of a part-
nership interest to include within his taxable income his distributive
share of the partnership earnings, except where that amount is dis-
proportionate to the donor's share, based on the capital contribution
or services of each.2  This latter section also provides that an intra-
family transfer of a partnership interest shall be considered a gift,
and the fair market value thereof treated as donated capital.3
"Family" has been defined to mean the ancestors, spouse, and lineal
descendants of a person, or a trust created for the primary benefit of
these individuals.4
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1951, there was considerable con-
fusion as to the exact status of the family partnership r in the scheme
of federal taxation. Some decisions were based on tax considera-
tions, while others rested on ownership of the partnership interest.
The Tax Aspect
Courts have tried to enforce federal tax laws uniformly, recog-
nizing the basic principle that income should be taxed to the person
earning ". . . the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when
paid." 6 A family partnership formed solely to avoid taxes could de-
I Revenue Act of 1951, § 340, 65 STAT. 511 (1951).
2 "In the case of any partnership interest created by gift, the distributive
share of the donee under the partnership agreement shall be includible in his
gross income, except to the extent that such share is determined without allow-
ance of reasonable compensation for services rendered to the partnership by
the donor, and except to the extent that the portion of such share attributable
to donated capital is proportionately greater than the share of the donor at-
tributable to the donor's capital." INT. REv. CODE § 191.
3 "For the purpose of this section, an interest purchased by one member of
a family from another shall be considered to be created by gift from the seller,
and the fair market value of the purchased interest shall be considered to be
donated capital." Ibid.
4Ibid.
5 One advantage of this form of organization is the opportunity it gives
a parent to divide his income among members of his family, who are then
taxed on their shares. INT. Rxv. CODE § 181; accord, United States v. Kaufman,
267 U. S. 408 (1925); cf. Scherf v. Commissioner, 161 F. 2d 495 (5th Cir.
1947). Thus, since the total tax paid on all the shares is less than the tax
on the original single income unit [see INT. REv. CoDE §§ 12(b), 400], a larger
net income remains within the family.
The importance of the husband-wife partnership as a convenient means of
reducing taxes has been decreased since 1948 by INT. REv. CDE § 12(d).
Family partnerships are still useful, however, as a means of splitting income
among members of the family other than the spouse. See ALExANDER, FDERAL.
TAx HANDBOOI § 1703 (Speisman ed. 1952).
6 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 119 (1940); cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281
U. S. 111, 112 (1930) (The usual taxpayer is the actual income-earner.);
accord, Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 739 (1949); Doll v. Corn-
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feat this principle 7 by causing the tax to be paid by the alleged part-
ners rather than the real producer and owner of the income.$ There-
fore, the Commissioner and the courts have gone beyond mere form,
and have sought to determine the substance of the transaction.9 Of
the many factors which have been considered in determining the
validity of a partnership, the elements apparently deemed most essen-
tial have been an "original capital" contribution,10 performance of
"vital services," 11 or a combination of both.12  The nature of the
missioner, 149 F. 2d 239 (8th Cir. 1945) ; see Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S.
5, 11 (1937). But the donor who enjoys the personal satisfaction of giving
has been taxed as if it were his income. Accord, Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U. S. 331 (1940); cf. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280, 292 (1946);
Helvering v. Horst, supra at 118; Blair v. Commissioner, supra at 12; Batman
v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 107 (5th Cir. 1951); Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153
F. 2d 506 (2d Cir. 1945) ; see Note, 164 A. L. R. 1144, 1147 (1946) ; Bruton,
Family Partnerships and The Income Tax-The Culbertson Chapter, 98 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 143, 161 (1949).
7 ,,... [T]he family partnership is looked upon with suspicion and is
subjected to special scrutiny to prevent tax avoidance." Nelson v. Commis-
sioner, 184 F. 2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1950) ; accord, Kent v. Commissioner, 170
F. 2d 131 (6th Cir. 1948) ; cf. Mauldin v. Commissioner, 155 F. 24 666 (4th
Cir. 1946); Bentley v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 228, aff'd, 184 F. 2d 668 (2d
Cir. 1950) ; see Note, 164 A. L. R. 1144, 1147 (1946). Where there is also an
intent to diminish one's taxes, the courts are "influenced" as to the significance
of the other facts. Elrod, Husband and Wife or "Faimily" Partnerships, 20
Ixm. L. J. 65, 68 (1944). But cf. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733,
747 ,(1949); Hardymon v. Glenn, 56 F. Supp. 269, 273 (W. D. Ky. 1944);
Thornton v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 116, 124 (1945).
s The wife is taxed on income chiefly due to the husband's industry, while
he reports a greatly reduced amount of taxable income. If the wife must buy
necessaries, she is not the real owner of her share, since the husband has con-
ditioned his gift to her.9 Accord, Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733 (1949) ; Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 335 (1940); Economos v. Commissioner, 167 F. 2d
165 (4th Cir. 1948); Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 239 (8th Cir. 1945);
Mead v. Commissioner, 131 F. 2d 323 (5th Cir. 1942) ; cf. Scharff v. Henslee,
Civil Nos. 962, 1182 (M. D. Tenn., Nov. 7, 1951), 4 P-H 1952 FED. TAx SERv.
1172,291 (1952) ; Byerly v. Commissioner, 154 F. 2d 879 (6th Cir. 1946) ; see
Note, 25 NomaR DAmE LAw. 134, 137 (1949).
10 Cf. Miller v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d 246 (6th Cir. 1950) ; Fletcher v.
Commissioner, 164 F. 2d 182 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Singletary v. Commissioner, 155
F. 2d 207 (5th Cir. 1946); Vaughan v. Carey, 88 F. Supp. 967 (N. D. Ohio
1949); Drew v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 5 (1949); Kuzmick v. Commissioner,
11 T. C. 288 (1948).
1l Cf. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946) ; Feldman v. Commis-
sioner, 186 F. 24 87 (4th Cir. 1950) ; LeSage v. Commissioner, 173 F. 2d 826
(5th Cir. 1949); Wilson v. Commissioner, 161 F. 2d 661 '(7th Cir. 1947);
Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941); Bentley v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T. C. 228, aff'd, 184 F. 2d 668 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Harmon v. Commis-
sioner, 13 T. C. 373 (1949); Jennings v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 505 (1948);
Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 73 (1946).
12 Cf. Barrett v. Commissioner, 185 F. 2d 150 (1st Cir. 1950) ; Collamer v.
Commissioner, 185 F. 2d 146 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Ginsburg v. Arnold, 176 F. 2d
879 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Graber v. Commissioner, 171 F. 2d 32 (10th Cir. 1948) ;
Canfield v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Arnold v. Schepps,
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test to be applied was crystallized in Commissioner v. Cudbertson,13
in which the query was said to be whether "... upon a considera-
tion of all facts . . . the partners joined together in good faith to
conduct a business ...... 14 The primary concern of the courts fol-
lowing this reasoning was whether the intent of the parties was to
decrease their tax 15 rather than whether the resulting association
was a partnership in fact.16
The Property Approach
Other courts, in considering family partnerships from the view-
point of the laws of property, applied local state laws to determine
the status of the income,17 or the legal rights and interests created.' 8
The federal revenue laws were then applied to the interests thus
ascertained.' 9 The principal issue before these courts was whether
the transfer of interest was valid so as to constitute the recipient
the owner.20 Thus, where the interest in a partnership was trans-
166 F. 2d 821 (5th Cir. 1948); Scherf v. Commissioner, 161 F. 2d 495 (5th
Cir. 1947) ; Singletary v. Commissioner, 155 F. 2d 207 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Boylin
v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 542 (1950); Harkness v. Commissioner, 13 T. C.
1039 (1949); Morrison v. Commissioner, 11 T. C. 696 (1948); McIntyre v.
Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 812 (1938).
13 337 U. S. 733 (1949).
14 "If, upon a consideration of all the facts, it is found that the partners
joined together in good faith to conduct a business, having agreed that the
services or capital to be contributed presently by each is of such value to the
partnership that the contributor should participate in the distribution of profits,
that is sufficient." Id. at 744. Cf. Miller v. O'Malley, 89 F. Supp. 697, 701
(D. Neb. 1950).
15 See Alexander v. Commissioner, Civil No. 13482 (5th Cir., March 6,
1952), 4 P-H 1952 FmD. TAX SmRv. 172,337 (1952). But cf. Thornton v.
Commissioner, 5 T. C. 116 (1945). "Mere purpose to avoid tax does not in
itself vitiate a transfer of property." Id. at 124.
16 The "business purpose doctrine" ". . . seems to contemplate that the
wife must render substantial and valuable services or add needed capital or
credit to the business in order to be considered a partner for income tax pur-
poses." Note, 164 A. L. R. 1144, 1153 (1946).
17 Black v. Commissioner, 114 F. 2d 355 (9th Cir. 1940).
Is Accord, United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F. 2d 326 (3th Cir. 1951);
Harvey v. United States, 185 F. 2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950); Shaw v. United
States, 94 F. Supp. 245 (W. D. Mich. 1939); cf. Blair v. Commissioner, 300
U. S. 5, 12 (1937) ; see Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 342 et seq. (1940)
(dissenting opinion); see Mannheimer and Mook, A Taxzwise Evaluation of
Family Partiterships, 32 IowA L. REv. 436, 451 (1947).
'9 Trapp v. United States, 177 F. 2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Irrgang v. Fabs,
94 F. Supp. 206 (S. D. Fla. 1950) ; cf. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U. S.
44 (1944); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5, 11 (1937).
20 Cf. Giffen v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 188 (9th Cir. 1951); Yiannias v.
Commissioner, 180 F. 2d 115 (8th Cir. 1950); Kohl v. Commissioner, 170 F.
2d 531 (8th Cir. 1948). But cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1934)
(Corporate reorganization, which fully complied with the statute, held ineffec-
tive as to taxpayer, since the entire scheme was evolved to avoid taxes rather
than to effect the purported reorganization. The "business purpose" rule
1952 ]
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ferred by gift, unless such gift was complete and effective by state
law,21 there was no valid partnership. 22  Following this approach,
these courts made substantial compliance with local law a prerequisite
for recognition of family partnerships for federal tax purposes.23
The refusal of the courts to follow one line of reasoning consis-
tently, led to serious instability in the law. Federal courts were hold-
ing family partnerships invalid for federal tax purposes where the
same partnerships would be valid under the local state law, 24 and
vice versa.25 There was great need for someone ". . . to make crystal
clear that there is no special concept of 'partnership' for tax pur-
poses .... ,, 26 This is the intent and aim of the new statutes.
2 7
Effect of the New Dejinition
The chief effect of Section 3797(a) (2) is to reduce the issues,
in determining the validity of a partnership, to the one question of
ownership.28 The former tests of "original capital" contribution, or
of "vital services" are superseded.2 9  Thus, were a taxpayer to give
enunciated and applied in the Gregory case was later extended to family
partnerships.).
21 See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 (1940). "State law creates
legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests
or rights, so created, shall be taxed." Id. at 80. The New York view on the
essential elements of a valid gift may be found in Vincent v. Putnam, 248 N. Y.
76, 161 N. E. 425 (1928) ; Petition of McCredy, 274 App. Div. 363, 83 N. Y. S.
2d 806 (3d Dep't 1948), appeal denfied, 299 N. Y. 799, 85 N. E. 2d 795 (1949) ;
It re Dobish's Vill, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 838 (Surr. Ct. 1950) ; In re Giovannozzi's
Estate 57 N. Y. S. 2d 528 (Surr. Ct 1945).
22 cf. Batman v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 107 (5th Cir. 1951); Miller v.
Commissioner, 183 F. 2d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 1950); Ellery, 4 T. C. 407, 412
(1944) ; Britt's Estate v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1951).
23 See note 19 .supra; see Giffen v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 188 (9th Cir.
1951) ; Weizer v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 772 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Commissioner
v. Tenney, 120 F. 2d 421 (1st Cir. 1941); Kier, 15 B. T. A. 1114 (1931);
Bartley, 4 B. T. A. 874 (1931); Newell, 17 B. T. A. 93 (1929); ALEXANDER,
FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK § 1701 (Speisman ed. 1952).
24 See Durwood v. Commissioner, 159 F. 2d 400 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Doll v.
Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 239 (8th Cir. 1945); Note, 164 A. L. R. 1144, 1156
(1946).
25 See Smith v. Henslee, 173 F. 2d 284 (6th Cir. 1949) ; Schroder v. Com-
missioner, 134 F. 2d 346 (5th Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Barnes' Estate,
30 F. 2d 289 (3d Cir. 1929) ; Parker, 6 T. C. 974 (1946) ; Note, 164 A. L. R.
1144, 1158 (1946).
26 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 754 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
27 The purpose of the bill is "... to harmonize the rules governing interests
in the so-called family partnership with those generally applicable to other
forms of property or business." U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph.
3089, 3128 (1951) (Senate Report); id. at 2901, 2933 (House Report).
28U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089, 3128 (1951) (Senate
Report) ; id. at 2934 (House Report).
29 "If the ownership is real, it does not matter what motivated the transfer




his wife shares of stock on condition that she invest them in a part-
nership, as was the situation in Commissioner v. Tower,3 0 the court
should still decide against the taxpayer. Today, however, the at-
tempted transfer would not give rise to a partnership because the
"gift" is conditional. The emphasis which this case placed upon
"original capital" was criticized in Commissioner v. Culbertson,31
which said the question to be determined was whether the parties had
intended to associate for the "... present conduct of the enterprise." 32
This latter test, itself, was criticized 3 3 as negating the rule that the
economic source of the income is to be taxed; now the test appears
obsolete.34 The only issue to be decided today is whether the pur-
ported partner actually owns his interest 3 5 The fact that the in-
terest resulted from a gift-long the source of litigation 3 6 with the
30327 U. S. 280 (1946) (Taxpayer gave his wife shares of stock on con-
dition that she contribute the assets represented by the stock into a new part-
nership. The corporation was liquidated and the partnership took. over its busi-
ness. The taxpayer retained control of the business, in which his wife was a
limited partner, and used her income for family expenses. The Court held
that there was no partnership as no substantial change in the relation of the
parties to the income had been made.).
31 337 U. S. 733, 741 (1949).
32 "The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a
partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard supposedly
established by the Tower case, but whether, considering all the facts-the agree-
ment, the conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements,
the testimony of disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their
respective abilities and capital contributions, the actual control of income and
the purposes for which it is used, and any other facts throwing light on their
true intent-the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose in-
tended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise." Id. at 742.
3 Bruton, supra note 6, at 156. "If intent to create such an arrangement
[see note 32 supra] is an intent to create a partnership within the meaning of
the revenue law, then the Clifford-Horst doctrine of economic source of the
income as a test of taxability seems to have gone by the board in partnership
cases." Ibid.
34 See note 29 stpra. "The concept that a special business purpose must be
the motive for the creation of a partnership interest, should now be eliminated
completely." Packel, The Next Inning of Family Partnerships, 100 U. oF PA.
L. Rsv. 153, 158 (1951). But see hxT. Rnv. Bu. Mim. 6767 (February 19,
1952), 4 P-H 1952 FED. TAX SEXR. 176,179 (1952) (Presence of a tax-
avoidance motive is not to be ignored, but is to be one of the many factors
determining the validity of the intrafamily gift); Schallerer, Civil No. 24,
175 (T. C., March 7, 1952), 4 P-H 1952 FED. TAX SERV. 1174,363 (1952).
35 "The amendment leaves the Commissioner and the courts free to inquire
in any case whether the donee or purchaser actually owns the interest in the
partnership which the transferor purports to have given or sold him." U. S.
Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089, 3129 (1951) (Senate Report) ; id. at
2934 (House Report).
36 See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733 (1949); Commissioner
v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78
(1940) ; Phillips v. United States, 193 F. 2d 132 (5th Cir. 1951); Miller v.
Commissioner. 183 F. 2d 246 (6th Cir. 1950); Kohl v. Commissioner. 170 F.
2d 531 (8th Cir. 1948); Scherf v. Commissioner, 161 F. 2d 496 (5th Cir.
1947) ; Rose v. Commissioner, 65 F. 2d 616 (6th Cir. 1933).
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Commissioner-apparently is immaterial to the decision.8 7
The Committee Reports accompanying the new statutes refer
to the confused state of the law manifested in the Tower and
Culbertson cases. Whether these cases caused or merely added to
the disorder was deemed irrelevant; 8 the important matter was that
confusion did exist. A large part of this disorder was due to the
refusal of many courts to apply local property law.39 While the new
statute was aimed at clarifying the law, the enactments do not pur-
port to be a new law of property for the nation. It is unnecessary to
choose this latter construction in order to rectify the interrelation of
partnership and tax law. The absence in the amendment of any in-
dication to the contrary, coupled with the facts that this approach
will eliminate much of the former confusion,40 and that there exists
favorable judicial precedent for this view, 41 combines to make the
conclusion almost inevitable that local law should determine the in-
terests, and the revenue laws be then applied.42  By employing this
reasoning, the federal laws can be applied uniformly where the tax-
able interest exists; and the tendency among states to adopt uniform
laws 43 assures that the legal interests resulting in similar fact situa-
tions will be the same in the several states.
The language of Section 3797 does not expressly limit the effect
of the statute to cases of family partnerships; rather the words of
the amendment seem applicable to all partnerships. This would be
in accord with the congressional intent to harmonize the law regard-
ing partnerships. Therefore, where any partnership fits the statutory
definition, regardless of how the partner acquired his interest, if he
is the real owner of that interest, he is a true partner, and taxable
on his share of the profits.44
37 The legislation was intended "... to make clear the fundamental prin-
ciple that, where there is a real transfer of ownership, a gift of a family part-
nership interest is to be respected for tax purposes without regard to the mo-
tives which actuated the transfer. . . ." U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev.
Pamph. 3089, 3130 (1951) (Senate Report) ; id. at 2935 (House Report). See
note 34 .rpra.
38 U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089, 3129 (1951) (Senate
Report) ; id. at 2934 (House Report).
39 See notes 24, 25 supra.
40 See note 29 supra.
41 See note 23 supra.
42 The prerequisites for such a conclusion, as established in Doll v. Com-
missioner, 149 F. 2d 239 (8th Cir. 1945), appear satisfied: the objective sought
necessarily implies that the cause of the prior confusion, a non-recognition of
local property law, be abolished. In addition, the uniform application of the
federal tax scheme will not be interfered with nor defeated by such conclusion.
43 See 7 U. L. A. xv (1949) (Table III).
44 See Packel, supra note 34. "The provision is a direction as to a particular
situation in which a family partnership should be recognized, and it does not
purport to exclude other situations from being similarly recognized." Id. at 160.
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Reallocation Under Section 191
The primary effect of the new Section 191 is to permit the Com-
missioner to reallocate partnership income received by the donee of
a partnership interest. Assume, for example, that the donee of a
40% interest received 80% of the profits, despite the fact that the
donor, who retained the 60% interest, performed most of the essen-
tial services. The Commissioner, in such a case, may refuse to allow
the donee to include as his taxable income that share of profits which
reasonably belongs to the donor.45  Since the donee may not report
this sum, it will be attributed and taxed to the donor. The effect
would be to compel erstwhile partners to distribute the profits equi-
tably. The disparity in the shares of the partners should be ap-
parent as of the execution of the partnership agreement. Where
later economic changes bring about the discrepancy, the power to
reallocate may not be exercised.46
The effect of Section 191, regarding reallocation, is not expressly
limited to family partnerships, since the words of the statute refer to
".. . the case of any partnership interest created by gift. . . . P47
Some have interpreted this provision loosely, so as to include cases
in which the interest was not created by gift.48 The statute, however,
is specific, 49 and since the primary goal of the section is obviously to
implement Section 3797, which, in defining partners, says nothing
about altering the profit-sharing arrangement,50 the statutory limita-
tion should be enforced. Even if the donee is not a family member,
as defined in Section 191, the reallocation provision would seem ap-
plicable. But if the interest were not obtained by gift, or from an-
other member of the family-in which case it is presumed a gift under
Section 191 51-it is submitted that Section 191 will not apply. There
are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the section expressly
refers to an interest created by gift, and neither the statute nor the
45 See note 2 supra. "... [T]he bill provides that in the case of any part-
nership interest created by gift the allocation of income, according to the terms
of the partnership agreement, shall be controlling for income tax purposes ex-
cept when the shares are allocated without proper allowance of reasonable
compensation for services rendered to the partnership by the donor, and except
to the extent that the allocation to the donated capital is proportionately greater
than that attributable to the donor's capital." Reallocation is allowed in the
latter case. U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089, 3130 (1951)
(Senate Report) ; id. at 2935 (House Report) ; see INT. REv. Bu. Mim. 6767
(February 19, 1952), 4 P-H 1952 FED. TAx SERv. 176,179 (1952).
46 See Packel, supra note 34, at 164.
47 See notes 2, 45 supra.
48 Packel, supra note 34. Section 191, it is said, will apply whether the in-
terests be in new or existing partnerships, ". .. and whether or not it is con-
tended that the case presents no element of gift or purchase of a partnership
interest" Id. at 163.
49 See notes 2, 45 supra.
50 See note 1 supra.
51 See note 3 supra.
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Committee Reports indicate an intent that it should be applied other-
wise.5 2  The presumption that a transfer of interest was by gift is
specifically related to Section 191, and applies only to members of a
family; " hence there is no presumption that a transfer between
other than family members was by gift. Second, there is no great
necessity for reapportioning partners' income where the parties are
strangers. Since the partnership contract is a business arrangement,
the parties can, and should, be expected to deal with eyes open and
at arm's length in its execution. When the partners are members
of the same family, a different situation exists, and the ordinary rules
of business should be modified.5 4
Family Defined
As indicated previously,55 Section 191 expressly states who are
the members of one's family. This clause is not expressly applied
nor apparently limited to Section 191 of the Code,56 as is the clause
relative to the presumption of gift. Since Section 3797 does not
state who, as owners of capital interests, may be partners,5 7 confu-
sion may result. It is submitted that the limitation of "family," as
found in Section 191, should be applied to define what persons will
be recognized under Section 3797 as members of a family partner-
ship. This would tend to effectuate the congressional plan of sim-
plifying the law, by removing any doubt caused by the indefiniteness
of Section 3797. One could then be certain that a wife, a child, a
parent or a trust would be recognized as a true member of a valid
family partnership.
Not only one's spouse, but also a person's ancestors and lineal
descendants may join him in a family partnership.58 The claim that
a child, especially a minor child, is a partner may well cause difficulty.
The problem that arises when some partners are children revolves
around the actual ownership of the interest given them.59 While the
52 See notes 2, 45 supra.
53 See note 3 supra.54 "The same standards apply in determining the bona fides of alleged fam-
ily partnerships as in determining the bona fides of other transactions between
family members." But these intrafamily transfers ". . . whether or not in-
volving partnership interest, afford much opportunity for deception and should
be subject to close scrutiny." U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089,
3129 (1951) (Senate Report) ; id. at 2934 (House Report).
55 See text at note 4 supra.
56 The last sentence of the new Section 191 reads: "The 'family' of any
individual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants, and
any trust for the primary benefit of such persons."
57 See text at note 1 supra.
58 See note 56 supra.
59 ,,... [H]owever, the owner of a partnership interest may have acquired
such interest, the income is taxable to the owner, if he is the real owner."
(italics added). U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089, 3128 (1951)
(Senate Report) ; id. at 2934 (House Report).
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donor may retain some control over the donated interest,60 a point
can be reached where the amount of power withheld is so great that
it negates the idea of a gift 61 since a conditional gift is invalid.
62
The matter is further complicated by the fact that the donor may be
a general partner, and the donee a limited partner.6 3 The difficulty
can only be resolved by looking at all aspects of the transaction in-
cluding the mental age and ability of the child, the parental control
exercised, and the ability of the child to manage his interest contrary
to the preference of the parent-donor. 64
The donor's ability to create a trust for the benefit of his spouse,
children, or ancestors, may help alleviate the problem of validity of
ownership of the interest by a child. Where such a trust is a mem-
ber of a family partnership, it will be considered a partner dependent
upon the ownership of its interest, and the use of the income.63
There is no prohibition against the settlor naming himself trustee,66
there may even be cases in which the husband-donor is himself a
partner, and the other partner is a trust of which he is the trustee.67
Needless to say, a searching inquiry would be essential to determine
60 Accord, Phillips v. United States, 193 F. 2d 132 (5th Cir. 1951); Whayne
v. Glenn, 59 F. Supp. 517, 524 (W. D. Ky. 1945); In re Nisbet's Will, 199
N. Y. 569, 96 N. E. 1135 (1910), affirming 139 App. Div. 1, 123 N. Y. Supp.
414 (1st Dep't 1910) ; In re Green's Estate, 247 App. Div. 540, 288 N. Y. Supp.
249 (4th Dep't 1936); In re Blum's Estate, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 771 (Surr. Ct.
1943).
61 . . [W]here . . . the benefits directly or indirectly retained blend so
imperceptibly with the normal concepts of full ownership, we cannot say that
the triers of fact committed reversible error when they found that the husband
was the owner... ." Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 336 (1940). Cf.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 119 (1940) ; In re Humphrey's Estate, 191
App. Div. 291, 181 N. Y. Supp. 169 (1st Dep't 1920); In re Hegeman's Estate,
38 N. Y. S. 2d 762 (Surr. Ct. 1942) ; see Note, 164 A. L. R. 1144, 1164 (1946).62 See note 21 supra; Case, Tax Consequences of the Family Partnership,
8 MD. L. RE,. 171, 189 (1944); Elrod, supra note 7, at 74; Hellerstein, The
Tax Status of Family Partnerships, 17 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 197, 214 (1945).63 See Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946) ; Barrett v. Commis-
sioner, 185 F. 2d 150 (1st Cir. 1950) ; Fletcher v. Commissioner, 164 F. 2d
182 (2d Cir. 1947); Boylin v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 542 (1950).64 INT. REV. Bu. Mim. 6767 (February 19, 1952), 4 P-H 1952 FED. TAX
SEav. 1 76,179 (1952).
65Ibid.; see U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089, 3129 (1951)
(Senate Report); id. at 2935 (House Report); cf. Helverinq v. Horst, 311
U. S. 112, 119 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 335 (1940);
Zander v. Commissioner, 173 F. 2d 624 (5th Cir. 1949); Benson v. Commis-
sioner, 161 F. 2d 821 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Hash v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 722
(4th Cir. 1945); Rose v. Commissioner, 65 F. 2d 616 (6th Cir. 1933);
McCauley v. Commissioner, 44 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1930); see Comment, 46
ILL. L. REv. 636, 638 (1951).66 U. S. Code Cong. Serv.. Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089, 3129 (1951) (Senate
Renort) ; id. at 2935 (House Report) ; accord, Sinopoulo v. Jones, 154 F. 2d
648, 651 (10th Cir. 1946) ; cf. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 343 (1940)
(dissentinz opinion) ; see Elrod, supra note 7, at 69; Hellerstein. supra note 62.
But cf. Whayne v. Glenn, 59 F. Supp. 517, 524 (W. D. Ky. 1945).
67 Ijd.
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whether such an arrangement were not a mere sham. But. the mere
retention of the power would not, ipso facto, seem enough to in-
validate the partnership for tax purposes.68 The test will be the
ownership of the partnership interest, the use made of the control
as trustee, and the disposition of the trust income.69 Where it is
found that the donor-trustee used his control chiefly to further his
own plans, or employed the income to defray expenses normally
borne by himself, the trust should be invalidated. 70
Difficulties Remaining
If the definition of "family" in Section 191 is exclusive, then
the presumption of gift would not seem to apply between brothers,
or other collaterals, since these persons do not come within the defi-
nition. Under such an interpretation, there would be no reallocation
of profits between brothers who purchased their interests. 71 This
might seem to be a somewhat strained application of the statute, but
it serves to introduce the problems left 'unsolved by the recent
amendments.
Another problem arises in the question of definition: just what
is meant by ". . . a partnership in which capital is a material income
producing factor. . .. ,"? 72 Congress gave no indication of its mean-
ing, but the idea has appeared before in cases involving personal
service corporations. In these cases, the decision was not based
upon the per cent of the total income that was produced by capital,
73
nor the amount of income thus derived,74 nor the amount of capital
so employed. 75 The issue was decided by finding whether capital,
rather than services, produced the income.76 Partnerships exist in
which capital has been found to be essential in the production of the
firm's income. 77 It has been suggested that the test might be
.. whether the death of one or more of the partners would tend
68 Ibid.
69 U. S. Code Cong. Serv., Sp. Rev. Pamph. 3089, 3129 (1951) (Senate
Report); id. at 2935 (House Report); INT. REv. Bu. Mina. 6767 (February
19, 1952), 4 P-H 1952 FE. TAx SEav. 176,179 (1952).
70 See note 61 supra.
71 See text following note 51"mspra.
72 See text at note 1 supra.
73 Edward P. Allison Co. v. Commissioner, 63 F. 2d 553, 558 (8th Cir.
1933).
74 Crider Bros. Commission Co. v. Commissioner, 45 F. 2d 974 (8th Cir.
1931); cf. Matteson Co. v. Willcuts, 12 F. 2d 447, 450 (D. Minn. 1926).
75 6 B. T. A. 1225.
76 Accord, Franciscus Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 39 F. 2d 583 (8th Cir.
1930). But cf. Fuller & Smith v. Routzahn, 23 F. 2d 959 (N. D. Ohio 1927).
7 See Whayne v. Glenn, 59 F. Supp. 517 (W. D. Ky. 1945); Hardymon
v. Glenn, 56 F. Supp. 269 (W. D. Ky. 1944); Thornton v. Commissioner, 5
T. C. 116 (1945) ; Note, 164 A. L. R. 1144, 1160 (1946).
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substantially to end the income of the partnership." 78 If it did, then
capital was probably not a material income-producing factor. The
problem rests with the courts; yet a conclusion might be hazarded
that if any income results from the use of capital, rather than from
services, the partnership is within the meaning of Section 3797.79
A further difficulty arises from the statute's failure to define the
term, "capital interest." It is probable that this phrase was intended
to refer to a share in the partnership assets, that is, a right to share
in the distribution of those assets upon the dissolution of the firm.°
The reallocation provision of Section 191 seems destined to
cause dissension. It is not certain whether it is to be limited to cases
of donated interests, or whether it may be applied even in instances
where the interest was obtained other than by gift. The provision
defining "family" may also cause litigation in cases of reallocation
on income between brothers or other collaterals who purchase their
interests.
Conclusion
Although the enactments may not do all that could be desired,
it is believed that they have achieved certain beneficial results. The
issues discussed in pre-amendment decisions 81 should now be reduced
to the one question of the real, bona fide ownership of the interest
under Section 3797.82 In effect this would be a return to the early
law which made ownership of the interest the controlling test. There-
fore, under the recent statute, the inconsistency between the local
property laws and the federal revenue laws appears to be resolved;
the former determining the partnership interests, and the latter tax-
ing them. In addition, the lesser amount of proof that should now
78 Packel, supra note 34, at 159.
71 See INT. REV. Bu. Min. 6767 (February 19, 1952), 4 P-H 1952 FFD.
TAX SEav. 176,179 (1952) (The Bureau speaks of firms in which "... capital
is not clearly unnecessary to the conduct of the business... 2').80 Accord, Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928). The only interest
a partner has in the firm's property is ".... simply a right to share in what
would remain of the partnership assets after its liabilities were satisfied ...
merely an interest in the surplus. . . ." Id. at 11. Cf. Shunk v. Commissioner,
173 F. 2d 747 (6th Cir. 1949); Jones v. Way, 78 Kan. 535, 97 Pac. 437
(190); Riddell v. Ramsey, 31 Mont. 386, 78 Pac. 597 (1904).8 1 See note 38 mspra. The Reports state that the courts, in applying the
tests of intention, business purpose, reality and control, ". . . have in practical
effect reached results which suggest that an intrafamily gift . . . where the
donee performs no substantial services, will not usually be the basis of a valid
partnership for tax purposes."
82 But the tests suggested in the Cidbertson case have been reaffirmed. If
the ". . . usual characteristics of an arm's length transaction . . ." exist, the
donee will probably be recognized as a partner, but the "... reality, good
faith, and business purpose . . ." of the transaction will still be sought. See
INT. REv. Bu. Mim. 6767 (February 19, 1952), 4 P-H 1952 FED. TAX SExv.
76,179 (1952).
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be required to establish a valid family partnership for tax purposes
will facilitate the reduction of the family's income taxes.
The provision for insuring that the distributive shares of the
partners in the family firm will be equitable, by permitting realloca-
tion if they are not, is another legislative achievement. The problems
remaining are not insurmountable, and should not bar successful en-
forcement of these amendments so as to bring some measure of har-
mony into the laws regarding the recognition of family partnerships
in the federal tax courts.
